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Gretchen Borchelt, Senior Counsel & Director of State Reproductive Health Policy

Gretchen Borchelt is Senior Counsel and Director of State Reproductive Health Policy at the National Women’s Law Center. She oversees the Center’s state-based legal and policy efforts to protect and expand women’s access to reproductive health care. Gretchen also works on a range of issues as part of the Center’s Health and Reproductive Rights Team, including health care law implementation, access to contraception, refusals to provide health care, and judicial nominations. Previously, she worked at Physicians for Human Rights and was a Women’s Law and Public Policy Fellow at the National Partnership for Women and Families. Gretchen is a graduate of Columbia Law School and the University of Virginia.

My Take

Gonzales v. Carhart: Just How Bad Is It?

Part 5: It’s Not Just What the Court Says, It’s How the Court Says It
by Gretchen Borchelt

As if all of the other parts of Gonzales v. Carhart I’ve described so far aren’t bad enough, there’s also the troubling language used by the Court.  It shows a Court contemptuous of a woman’s right to make decisions about abortion, and indicates that Roe v. Wade is not secure.

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Gonzales v. Carhart: Just How Bad Is It?

Part 4: The Court Tells Vulnerable Women to Go to Court for the Safest Healthcare
by Gretchen Borchelt

Like last week’s installment, this week’s focuses on a technical legal point that will have a huge impact on real women’s lives.  The Supreme Court in Gonzales v. Carhart said that if an individual woman wants to access the safest healthcare for her, she will have to go to court in order to get it. 

The Court did this by changing its mind on whether women and their doctors can bring “facial challenges” to abortion restrictions.  Facial challenges are those that say an entire law is unconstitutional on its face, and prevent the law from going into effect before anyone is injured by it.  In Gonzales v. Carhart, the Court said that the lawsuits brought against the federal ban because of a lack of health exception should not have proceeded as facial challenges.  Instead, the Court said that challenges to the law should have been “as-applied” challenges.  As-applied challenges require individuals to go to court to stop the law from being applied to them because of their particular circumstances. 

In this case, that means that vulnerable women – women with health conditions ranging from placental cancer to blood disorders and women with fetuses who have grave fetal abnormalities – have to find a lawyer and go to court if they want access to the procedure that may be the safest for them.  This puts individual women in a terrible position.  As Justice Ginsburg said in her dissent, a “woman ‘suffer[ing] from medical complications’ needs access to the medical procedure at once and cannot wait for the judicial process to unfold.” 

This is a huge change from prior practice.

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Gonzales v. Carhart: Just How Bad Is It?

Part 3: The Court Weakened a Standard of Abortion Law
by Gretchen Borchelt

This entry in the Gonzales v. Carhart series concerns a technical legal point, but it is crucial.  It’s about the standard courts use when reviewing whether laws limiting access to abortion are constitutional.  As I’ll explain, the Court in Gonzales v. Carhart weakened the standard, which is likely to mean that more restrictions on abortion will be upheld by courts.

First, a little background:  Courts use different standards of review to determine whether government restrictions on constitutional rights are valid.  In a 1992 case, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the Court adopted the “undue burden” standard for abortion restrictions.  The Court said if a “state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion,” it imposes an undue burden and courts must strike it down.  Although this was a weakening of the standard originally adopted by the Court in Roe v. Wade (that was “strict scrutiny,” which essentially presumes restrictions are unconstitutional), the undue burden standard still represented an elevated standard of review.

But in Gonzales v. Carhart, the Court weakened the undue burden standard in two different ways.

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Gonzales v. Carhart – Just How Bad Is It?

Part 2: The Supreme Court, Now Endorsing Paternalism (cont’d)
by Gretchen Borchelt

In addition to the two new interests I blogged about yesterday, there is another one that deserves particular attention and discussion.  It contains ideas about women that are so retrogressive and patronizing that they are almost unbelievable for 2007. Yet they are now part of Supreme Court doctrine.

The majority of the Court in Gonzales v. Carhart recognized a new principle of protecting “the bond of love the mother has for her child.”  The Court said protecting that “bond” could justify prohibiting a medically-approved abortion procedure.  As we explained in a past blog, the Court said banning what could be the safest procedure for a particular woman was for the woman’s own good.  In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg recognized this new interest for what it is—paternalism.  The idea that  the Court and government know what is best for women and their families takes us back to cases decided by the Court over a century ago.  For example:

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Gonzales v. Carhart: Just How Bad Is It?

Part 2: The Supreme Court, Now Endorsing Paternalism
by Gretchen Borchelt

This is Part 2 of a series on the Supreme Court abortion decision Gonzales v. Carhart.  For Part 1, click here.

Another troubling aspect of the Court's decision in Gonzales v. Carhart is its recognition of new government interests that can constitutionally justify restrictions on a woman's access to abortion. 

First, the Court recognized Congress's interest in banning what it termed a "brutal and inhumane" procedure.  While federal and state governments have always been allowed to justify restrictions on abortion in order to protect potential fetal life, never before has the "gruesomeness" of the procedure been a factor.  As Justice Ginsburg points out in her dissent, "the Act scarcely furthers that interest [in promoting potential life]: The law saves not a single fetus from destruction, for it targets only a method of performing abortion."  And with a new interest of banning procedures the state or Congress considers "gruesome" and "brutal," what is to stop anti-choice legislators from banning all abortion methods, one by one?  Won't they describe each abortion method as "brutal and inhumane"?  This newly recognized government interest gives license to anti-choice legislators go after all abortion procedures.

Second, Congress asserted an interest in protecting the reputation of the medical profession.

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